LOP issues

[Marquês de Alorna]

Dear all,

Sorry if this was already discussed elsewhere (please point me to a past thread if this is the case), but since I've seen that a lot of people praise the LOP mechanism implemented in HW-LG instead of "Victory Points", I'd like to say something about some of its disadvantages that sometimes destroy the realism of the game.

From a "GAME" perspective it makes all sense to have LOPs as already implemented. However, from a "SIMULATION" perspective I have some doubts.
Some debate has been taking place about the need for a Victory Points system, which forces players to implement it out of the game. So I will not repeat their arguments.

Instead, I would like to address the effects on morale. Two days ago, when playing the Amstetten scenario with the French, and since I'm still learning the game, I have committed a mistake, which allowed 3 enemy units (2 Hussar + 1 Infantry) to control the LOP of the French army. I have immediately dispatched all the cavalry (2 Cuirassier + 2 Hussar + 1 Horse Arty) to take the position occupied by the enemy. But the effect of loosing the LOP was so heavy that the charges of the Cuirassiers were always defeated by the enemy Hussars (note: the following day I did not commit the same mistake and the Cuirassiers could easily defeat the very same Hussar units in all encounters). Then the French Hussars were also defeated. Lannes's infantry was also routed in a fight that took place kilometers away from cavalry battle!!!

My question is: is this realistic? I don't think so.

Were LOP important in Napoleonic battles. No doubt. The authors are unanimous about that. But does this effect on morale translate that importance? But this would be mainly to grant supply routes (strategic level), to grant an avenue for reinforcements (grand-tactical level) and to allow an ordered retreat in case of defeat (grand-tactical level).

No doubt the troops could become more hesitant upon knowledge that the LOP was not controlled anymore by their side. But would they often know that except when all was already hopeless, when they wanted to retreat and the path was blocked (which could force a surrender)? If commanders had difficulty knowing what was happening on the battlefield, what about common soldiers? Even if the commanders knew the true situation, of course they would keep it secret as long as possible.
Returning to my example of the Amstetten scenario, how could Lanne's infantry know that control of the LOP had been lost so many kilometers away? This is simply not logical and in my opinion deserves some thought on how the LOP control effects are treated in HW-LG.

Regards,
António

[AJ]

That my friend, is a very good argument and deserves some further discussion. In our pbem battles, it has almost become the standard battleplan to get one or both (we always use 2) LOP's as quickly as possible. However, this may also have been the tactics in real life. As for VP's, we use them over at nbc in our pbem/MP campaign battles. Here is a screen of one drawn up by our CinC, Gunner24.

[JMM]

You are right... The present system controling the LoP  isn't robustness.. so for the next patch (1c), I worked on this procedure again.
The method seems more realistic... that said, you have always to protect your LoP with several units (4 ou 5).
Some ENY may not take the control...

No doubt the troops could become more hesitant upon knowledge that the LOP was not controlled anymore by their side. But would they often know that except when all was already hopeless, when they wanted to retreat and the path was blocked (which could force a surrender)? If commanders had difficulty knowing what was happening on the battlefield, what about common soldiers? Even if the commanders knew the true situation, of course they would keep it secret as long as possible.
Returning to my example of the Amstetten scenario, how could Lanne's infantry know that control of the LOP had been lost so many kilometers away? This is simply not logical and in my opinion deserves some thought on how the LOP control effects are treated in HW-LG.

hummm... how? It's not displayed in the game but you have to imagine the army with the chariots, the ammunition.. several hundred of different devices and the people moving between the different sectors (ammunition, prisoners with the guards, seriously injured person .. )

JMM

[Marquês de Alorna]

hummm... how? It's not displayed in the game but you have to imagine the army with the chariots, the ammunition.. several hundred of different devices and the people moving between the different sectors (ammunition, prisoners with the guards, seriously injured person .. )
JMM

JMM, I think that your argument is not convincing enough. First of all, I doubt that many soldiers had a clear picture of the commander's intent and so the news about friendly units (specially elite) being defeated would have much more impact than the news about one or two enemy units being seen at some point on a road kilometers away. You must agree that the impact of LOP control in HW-LG is very exagerated, which makes its meaning very "game"-like.
ATTN: This is no offense to you or to HW-LG which is an wonderful game! These aspects could be easily tweaked.

In my opinion the LOP control should not have the impact on morale that it currently has. In fact it would not schock me if it had no impact at all on the morale of units.
Since LOPs are the default direction followed by fleeing units, a blocked LOP path should increase the probability of unit surrender and becoming prisoner, which is already an incentive to control the enemy's LOP. It should also impact the statistics at the end of the game (e.g. number of prisoners, extent of victory, etc.).  When battles continue the following day, it should also have impact on the supplies (I'm not sure if supplies are modeled in the game already). This would suffice to make players willing to control the enemy LOP and in a much more realistic way.

Regards,
António

[Franciscus]

I have to agree with Marquês. In fact, the only issues that should affect line troops morale should be very local factors: being flanked, overwhelmed, attacked by enemy guard units, commanding officer killed, out of ammo, or seeing friendly (specially elite) units routing ("La Guarde recule").

I can accept the effect of LOP on morale, but this being a simulation, it is IMHO exagerated.

Regards

[AJ]

After giving this some thought since my earlier post, I am leaning more toward JMM's interpretation of the effect.  However they may have found out, it is a historical reality that when troops became aware, by whatever means, of the presence of the enemy in their rear, it had a large impact on moral. Maybe there is an argument that the effect in HLG is too big, although I am not sure.

Although at Waterloo, it was the Guards routing not the loss of an LOP, the effect was very quickly transmitted through the French army with a full scale rout following.  It isn't unreasonable to suppose the presence of the enemy in the rear, cutting the armies LOP, would transmit with some rapidity.

Maybe there is someone who has done some research and can post citing sources, not opinions, as to the effect in question?

[Marquês de Alorna]

After giving this some thought since my earlier post, I am leaning more toward JMM's interpretation of the effect.  However they may have found out, it is a historical reality that when troops became aware, by whatever means, of the presence of the enemy in their rear, it had a large impact on moral. Maybe there is an argument that the effect in HLG is too big, although I am not sure.
Maybe there is someone who has done some research and can post citing sources, not opinions, as to the effect in question?

Just one more opinion, taking my Amstetten battle as example =)...
No matter the effect that LOP control may have, do you think that 2 Cuirassier + 2 Hussar units + 1HA would rout before 2 enemy Hussar units plus 1 stuck infantry unit? In my opinion they would instead know that their superior power would grant the LOP being retaken with very limited effort effort.

Regards,
António

[Count von Csollich]

Just one more opinion, taking my Amstetten battle as example =)...
No matter the effect that LOP control may have, do you think that 2 Cuirassier + 2 Hussar units + 1HA would rout before 2 enemy Hussar units plus 1 stuck infantry unit? In my opinion they would instead know that their superior power would grant the LOP being retaken with very limited effort effort.

hehe, after the battle of Heilsberg, where d'Espagne's Cuirassiers were used badly for an insane frontal assault over unsuitable terrian against a fortified position, they were so frightened and discouraged during the next few weeks, that in the next engagement the cuirassiers fled out of the woods, the supporting units formed line to receive the enemy, who routed them in the first place, but noone came...they were so unnerved that they just panicked without reason!  

CvC

[Marquês de Alorna]

hehe, after the battle of Heilsberg, where d'Espagne's Cuirassiers were used badly for an insane frontal assault over unsuitable terrian against a fortified position, they were so frightened and discouraged during the next few weeks, that in the next engagement the cuirassiers fled out of the woods, the supporting units formed line to receive the enemy, who routed them in the first place, but noone came...they were so unnerved that they just panicked without reason!  
CvC

But, dear Count, my Cuirassiers were still fresh when they uselessly charged the enemy Hussars =).

António

[AJ]

In fairness, I have seen the odd inexplicable rout myself but something may have been going on in the calculations I wasn't aware of.
This subject has peaked my interest, so I've set off to do a little research myself. This is what I've found so far.

Napoleon would often employ a maneuver of envelopment - pinning the foe's attention with a detachment while the bulk of the army swept against the hostile lines of communications to sever the enemy's links with his bases. ... On occasion, Napoleon would merge features of these two classic strategies." (David Chandler - "Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars" p 19)

His favorite strategy was to envelop one of the enemy's army's flanks and threaten its rear and communications, forcing it either to retire hurriedly or to turn and fight at a disadvantage.

I haven't drawn any conclusions from these sources yet, early days

[Count von Csollich]

But, dear Count, my Cuirassiers were still fresh when they uselessly charged the enemy Hussars =).

António

the engagement I was talking about was 4 days AFTER the disaster at Heilsberg  - they were very fresh there too...it was just a little story to show overall morale effects in reality...even the "tanks" of that age, could easily be routed when they were frightened or simply had a "bad day"!

CvC

[Count von Csollich]

an overall summary on the importance of LOPs (in general):

how were messages about everything sent in those days? - by horse, messanger, carriage..whatever...how would those messages reach the army HQs? - via the roads designated LOPs...not only lines of Operation, but also Communication...

when an army lost these lines, it was on its own...no more reinforcements...no more orders from the emperor in Vienna, Moscow, Berlin (King)....and no more line of retreat....

the entire baggage train is lost...which means all the ammunition and food is gone...maybe the reserve artillery is captured as well...and not to forget!  - the personal belongings of the CinC...which is always bad for morale, because he'll be less than pleased about that and his staff will have to pay for his moods!

if you look at the Napoleonic battles: why form a rear guard at all? - why post the reserves to the rear?...because when the army was beaten the main/last task for the CinC was to save as much of his army intact as possible to fight another day! - but to do so...he needed an open line of retreat! - better known as LOP! - many people died during the final stages of the battle to defend those LOPs and to give the rest of the army enough time to retreat (hopefully in good order, if not, give it enough time to run, without being chased by light cavalry!)

and if you turn the flank of an army, like Napoleon did so very often (if you compare Waterloo with Wagram, you will see that it is basically the same plan!), it was usually forced to withdraw in order to not be cut of the LOPs...
so if you want you could also say: apart from the destruction of the enemy army, the LOPs were the main thing battles were fought over! - because any maneuver to cut off the enemy from the rear, outmaneuver him , or isolate him always involved the basic idea of cutting or disrupting the enemy's LOPs!

CvC

[Franciscus]

I understand your arguments, Count. But you are talking about a strategical level, involving whole armies and measured in days/weeks. But how about the tactical, "immediate", brigade vs brigade level, measured in minutes/hours ?
I think that you are a military professional, IIRC. I do not know if you are or were involved in actual fighting. But at squad level, do you really think the immediate concern of a soldier is if his army's line of retreat is secure ? Or rather if his friends are being killed while his unit is surrounded and out of ammo (even if the rest of the army is secure ??)

IMHO, the loss of LOP should have some effect, but not an immediate effect in units fighting miles away, out of sight of their rear.

Regards

[Count von Csollich]

I am a special forces soldier, and I study military history at the moment, and probably an officer soon to be...and if one thing is certain on a battlefield...as a soldier you want to be sure that you will be able to survive when you are forced to retreat!!!! - Fight to the final bullet...well this happens rarely, if at all! - so yes...the most important thing, when you realize that you will lose the battle is the knowledge that you will be able to retreat into safety and put some distance between you and the enemy - which is impossible with the LOPs being cut off! - it was back then...and is still now! (helicopters only change so much...)

CvC

[AJ]

The British military historian and theorist Bassill H. Liddell Hart wrote, "...in the campaign of 1809 Napoleon is again seen trying, at Landshut and Vienna, to manoeuvre onto the enemy's rear.

Ronald E.M. Goodman (Molossian Naval Academy, training reference)

Turning maneuvers are indirect approaches that attempt to swing wide around an enemy's flank to so threaten an enemy's supply and communication lines that the enemy is forced to abandon a strong position or be cut off and encircled. Napoleon was a master of the turning movement, using it many times between 1796 and 1812. Robert E. Lee used the maneuver at the Second Battle of Bull Run (1862); the German drive to the French coast in 1940 was another example.

I'm still trolling for reliable info. In support of the Count, the reference to Landshut & Bull Run, can only be in a tactical nature of the set piece battle. Whereas the German drive to the French coast would have been strategic. From what I am learning, attacking LOP/LOC's was done on a larger scale strategically and on a smaller battlefield scale, tactically. As to the tactical effect in battle, I have already given my opinion but my understanding of the effect of this maneuver can only be enhanced by the opinion of others.