Well Gentlemen, I started this little topic off, so I’d better weigh in. As I said earlier, I have been watching the posts of our French brothers in arms on this topic. It is curious to observe how passionate they are on this subject, I get the impression they are still trying to find one person to blame and most (not all) refuse to lay the blame on the Emperors doorstep.
I am presenting to you a synopsis of their arguments, which are quite enlightening. They fall into 2 areas, Strategic and Tactical. I know I will miss a lot of their points, I apologize in advance.
STRATEGIC
Some feel that Napoleons strategy was to defeat both Wellington and Blucher then sue for peace with the Austrians and Russians. Others, that he meant to separate Wellington and Blucher, defeat Wellington soundly, hoping that Blucher had no stomach to fight on, and then seek peace. I feel that the latter hypothesis holds no water. He attacked Blucher at Ligny first, surely with the intention of destroying him there; he didn’t achieve as complete a victory as he wished and learning of the affair at Quatre Bras, he leaves the inept Grouchy to chase Blucher while he himself goes to deal with Wellington. In fairness to Grouchy, our French friends point out that Grouchy’s troops were tired and in no state to effectively pursue. Here the Grand Strategy is already unraveling.
From a strategic point of view, they raised another very interesting argument. Why leave your most able General in Paris raising an Army. As I learned, Davout was given this task. He who could snatch victories so brilliantly, was made head of the recruiting office, leaving Ney and Grouchy to command his wings. Did the Emperor harbor suspicions as to Davout’s loyalty? Many of our French friends feel that from both a Strategic and a Tactical point of view, Davouts omission as Chief of Staff, in favor of Soult, was the first and possibly the gravest mistake of the campaign.
TACTICAL
So much has been written on the tactical aspects of Waterloo that I couldn’t hope to cover all of them here. I will endeavor however to convey the main points of our Gallic friends.
Soult was past his best and had already been bested by Wellington in the Peninsula campaign, Wellington therefore had a psychological advantage over him from the outset. Some of our friends cannot understand why 15,000 French troops, that D’Erlon could have sorely used in his assault, were employed against Hougemont, when a Brigade could have pinned down the defenders with ease. The old one, of brave Ney’s lack of use of combined arms in his cavalry assault, even evokes anger amongst them. What of Wellingtons left they say, why wasn’t a determined attempt to turn it, made. This has puzzled me for years, surely if Blucher were to join Wellington, it would be on the left flank, Napoleons right and rear. The same combined arms argument comes up with the assault of the Old Guard. Others argue vehemently that the battle was lost due to ineffective preparatory Artillery bombardments and that Napoleon as an artillery man, should have known the cannon balls would not bounce off the muddy fields.
Little credit is given to the generalship of Wellington or the manner in which his army stood their ground. It is almost as though Wellington was there to be had and the failure to do so was entirely due to French mistakes.
CONCLUSION
The following are my thoughts on the subject, not those of our friends.
Whatever the cause of the Emperors demise at Waterloo, I feel there is no one action that caused it. Rather it was a combination of errors, both Strategic and Tactical, which compounded in a domino effect. If I was backed into a corner to give just 2 reasons, I would say “Davout & Wellington”. The absence of the former and the presence of the latter, contributed to all that went wrong for the French and went right for the Allies.
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Sujet: WATERLOO who was to blame (Lu 33723 fois)